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Over the next several years, as various provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) take effect, the landscape of health insurance in the U.S. will increasingly shift. For 
children, states’ Children’s Health Insurance Programs (CHIP) will continue to play a vital role 
in meeting their health insurance needs at least through 2015, although the longer-term outlook 
for CHIP is less certain.   
 
In the years leading up to the ACA, many states began moving toward far more inclusionary 
CHIP programs, extending eligibility to children in families with incomes far higher than 
historical eligibility thresholds. Between 2002 and 2009, for example, 13 states boosted their 
income eligibility threshold for CHIP to between 200 and 400 percent of the federal poverty line 
(FPL). Several studies have explored the effects of previous public health insurance expansions, 
including the Medicaid expansions of the late 1980s and the introduction of CHIP in 1996, on 
take-up of public coverage, crowd-out of private coverage, and insurance coverage rates (Cutler 
and Gruber 1996; Shore-Sheppard 2008; Bansak and Raphael 2006; Hudson et al. 2005; LoSasso 
and Buchmueller 2004; Sommers et al. 2007; Ham and Shore-Sheppard 2005). However, 
existing studies of CHIP extend at most through 2002, and none that we are aware of has 
explored the effects on coverage of the considerable changes in eligibility associated with recent 
expansions.  
 
The extension of eligibility for public insurance to higher income children has not occurred 
without controversy. A touchstone has been concern about the potential for and magnitude of 
“crowd-out,” defined as the extent to which an increase in the availability of public insurance   3
decreases coverage by private insurance. In 2007, states’ eligibility expansions triggered a 
controversial memorandum (later rescinded) from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) outlining a stringent set of conditions that states would have to meet in order to 
offer CHIP eligibility to higher income families (Smith 2007). Among other requirements, states 
offering eligibility to individuals in families with incomes above 250 percent of the FPL had to 
establish a minimum one year-period of uninsurance prior to eligibility for coverage and 
document that rates of private insurance coverage did not decline substantially. In practice, states 
that extended CHIP eligibility to higher income families additionally attempted to control crowd-
out by requiring those families to pay premiums for CHIP coverage. 
 
In this article, we offer an analysis of the effects of CHIP expansions from 2002-2009 on take-up 
of public coverage, crowd-out of private coverage, and rates of insurance coverage. Our results 
provide new empirical evidence about how the availability of subsidized public insurance to 
higher income families affects enrollment in public insurance, enrollment in private insurance, 
uninsurance rates, and the tradeoffs among them. In addition, we describe the implications of our 
results for issues related to the implementation of the ACA.  
 
Changes to CHIP—2002 to 2009  
Movement toward universal coverage of children is the defining feature of CHIP program 
changes during the last decade. Between 2002 and 2009, 18 states increased their income 
eligibility threshold for CHIP (Figure 1). In a few states, the changes were modest, from an 
eligibility threshold in the range of 133 to 150 percent of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) to a 
level at or below 200 percent of the FPL. But in 13 states, the income threshold was boosted to   4
between 200 and 400 percent FPL, with 7 of the states extending eligibility for those with 
incomes between 3 times ($66,150 in 2009) and 4 times ($88,200 in 2009) the FPL (Kaiser 
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). 
Of note, because all states disregard certain types of income and allow certain credits when 
determining a family’s income for the purpose of establishing Medicaid or CHIP eligibility, 
many families whose total income is above the stated threshold will meet eligibility criteria after 
the disregards and credits are applied (Cohen et al. 2008). 
 
In some states, coincident with these changes have been requirements that families share in the 
cost of public coverage with premium contributions and/or copayments tied to use of health care 
services. By 2008, most states required at least some premium contribution for a subset of CHIP 
enrollees; only 16 states had no such requirements at any income level. Among states requiring a 
contribution, most absolved individuals in families with income less than 150 percent FPL of any 
premium cost-sharing and some only required contributions for families with incomes at least 
twice the FPL. Among the states that offered coverage to families with incomes at least 3 times 
FPL, premium contribution requirements ranged from $240 to more than $1,000 per year for a 
family with two children.
1  
 
The movement toward universal coverage in some states has been accompanied by a variety of 
additional program modifications, such as targeted outreach efforts, marketing of the program to 
reduce stigma associated with participation in a public program, and streamlined administrative 
processes for enrollment or renewal—all designed to increase enrollment among eligible 
children—as well as precautionary measures designed to reduce crowd-out, such as waiting   5
periods between loss of private coverage and public eligibility and premium assistance programs 
for individuals who have an offer of private coverage (SHADAC 2009).  
  
Previous Evidence on Take-Up and Crowd Out  
 
Take-up and crowd-out have been studied in the context of Medicaid expansions of the 1980s 
and, more recently, in the context of CHIP. (Cutler and Gruber 1996; Shore-Sheppard 2008; 
Bansak and Raphael 2006; Hudson et al. 2005; LoSasso and Buchmueller 2004; Sommers et al. 
2007; Ham and Shore-Sheppard 2005; Gruber and Simon 2008). Studies of early Medicaid 
expansions find higher take-up rates of public coverage among newly eligible children compared 
to studies of the effects of CHIP implementation. For children made eligible through Medicaid 
expansions, Cutler and Gruber (1996) report a 24 percent take-up rate and Shore-Sheppard a 15-
19 percent take up rate, for example.  By comparison, LoSasso and Buchmuller (2004) estimate a 
take-up rate of between 5.4 and 9.1 percent and Gruber and Simon (2008) report a 7.2 percent 
take-up rate among children made eligible for public insurance through CHIP. The relatively low 
take-up rate among children made eligible for CHIP (compared to those made eligible through 
Medicaid expansions) may reflect a greater likelihood of having health insurance through some 
other source. 
 
A number of methodological issues have confronted the estimation of crowd-out. Researchers 
haves used alternative definitions of crowd out, and crowd-out estimates have varied according 
to the specific eligibility change studied, the timing of the measurement of health insurance, the 
specification of controls in analysis, and the type of data used (administrative program data   6
versus data from population-based surveys). Further, the statistical uncertainty around crowd out 
estimates has been infrequently analyzed and reported (Davidson et al. 2004). Studies based on 
data from population-based surveys (e.g., the Survey of Income and Program Participation, 
Community Tracking Survey, Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, and Current Population 
Survey), typically find crowd-out rates of 25-50 percent (CBO 2007). Gruber and Simon (2008) 
broadly characterize findings from initial studies of crowd-out in the Medicaid expansion era as 
“large,” though subsequent findings related to the same expansions do not corroborate initial 
estimates. Among studies of CHIP, LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004) report an average crowd-
out rate across states with differing waiting period requirements of about 50 percent; Hudson and 
colleagues (2005) report a range from 35 to 70 percent; and the main estimate from Gruber and 
Simon’s analyses (2008) is 60 percent. 
 
A question of considerable relevance to the design of expansions in public insurance programs is 
whether take-up of public coverage and crowd-out private coverage among children in higher 
income families differs from that among children in lower income families. On balance, take-up 
is expected to be lower among higher income children than their lower income counterparts 
because more higher income children have employer-sponsored insurance (ESI); consequently, 
the need for public coverage is lower. At the same time, crowd-out may be more pronounced 
among higher income children precisely because ESI is more common. On the other hand, higher 
income families may be less inclined to enroll in public coverage if they associate greater stigma 
with participating in a public program, if public coverage is not as generous or has a more 
limited provider network compared to private coverage, or if public coverage is perceived to be 
less reliable because of the potential for policy changes affecting eligibility.    7
 




Our main sources of data were the 2002-2009 Annual Social and Economic Supplements 
(ASEC) of the Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS-ASEC, which is administered each 
February-April by the U.S. Census Bureau, collects labor market, sociodemographic, and health 
insurance data from samples of households that are representative of each state. The health 
insurance questions enable researchers to classify children’s coverage as public (Medicaid or 
CHIP), private (group or non-group), or none, and subjects are allowed to report both public and 
private coverage. Notably, the CPS includes a confirmatory question for individuals who report 
not having health insurance coverage. The study sample consisted of children younger than 18 
who were in families with incomes between 200 and 400 percent of the FPL.
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We compiled data from various sources to characterize states’ CHIP programs along a number of 
domains, including income eligibility thresholds, income disregards, other eligibility criteria, 
whether CHIP is integrated with the state’s Medicaid program or separate, and whether the state 
has a waiver that allows for parental eligibility (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the 
Uninsured 2002-2009; TRIM3; Bissell and Allen 2001).  
 
We obtained state-level estimates of unemployment rates, poverty rates among children, 
unionization rates, and per capita income from CPS data and merged these variables to   8
individual observations. We obtained information on the employee share of private insurance 
premiums for family coverage by firm size for each state and year from summary tables from the 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey-Insurance Component (MEPS-IC). We used these data to 
calculate a state level measure of the average price of private insurance by taking the average by 
firm size within a state and multiplying these averages by the percentage of workers within each 





Our analyses were based on multivariate regression models. Our primary outcome measures 
were whether the child had any public insurance during the year, whether the child had any 
private insurance during the year, and whether the child had no insurance coverage during the 
year. We analyzed each of the dependent variables separately. The key independent variable of 
interest was eligibility. We used the information we obtained on states’ eligibility criteria in each 
year to impute eligibility for individual children using the demographic and socioeconomic data 
reported in the CPS-ASEC.
3  
 
As previous studies have highlighted, two concerns about the eligibility variable are that it is 
measured with error, given limitations of the survey data on which imputation of eligibility is 
based, and that it is potentially endogenous, given families’ ability to modify their income to 
meet an eligibility threshold through job choice or hours worked. To address these concerns, we 
used instrumental variables estimation, which is a method for obtaining unbiased estimates when   9
there is measurement error or endogeneity in an independent variable. Our instrument for 
eligibility was first described by Cutler and Gruber (1996) and has been used extensively in 
subsequent studies (Bansak and Raphael 2006; LoSasso and Buchmuller 2004; Hudson et al. 
2005). The instrument was the percentage of a random sample of children of a particular age in 
families with incomes between 200 and 400 percent of the FPL from all states in a particular 
year who would have been eligible for public insurance in that state and year under the rules in 
place in that state at that time. We derived the instrument (a different value for each age-state-
year cell) using a sample of 300 children from each age group and year.  
 
The covariates models include controls for a comprehensive set of individual and family 
characteristics including the age, race, and gender of the child; the size of the family and 
household structure (one parent family, two parent family, or child lives with grandparent); 
parental assessment of child’s health  (on a 1-5 scale); highest level of education for either 
parent; a set of indicators for whether the child is foreign-born or his/her parent is foreign born 
and length of time the child has been in the U.S.; and family income as a percentage of the 
poverty line. We include a set of variables describing parental employment to capture differences 
across families in the probability of having an insurance offer. Specifically, we include indicators 
for whether any parent is employed full time, employed part-time, employed in the public sector, 
or is self-employed. For those employed full time in the private sector, we also include indicators 
for category of occupation of the parent (where we choose the parent with the occupation that is 
most likely to provide an offer of insurance) and for the firm size of the parent in the largest firm. 
   10
We also include selected characteristics of each state to control for their potential direct effect on 
insurance coverage outcomes and relationship with policy changes affecting eligibility in each 
state. We include measures of current and lagged unemployment, per capita income, the 
percentage of children age 0-5 in each state who live in poverty, the percentage of children age 
6-18 in each state living in poverty, the percentage of employed individuals in the state who are 
unionized, and the price of private insurance. We also include controls for several characteristics 
of the public insurance programs in the state: whether the SCHIP program is integrated with 
Medicaid or separate, and whether the state allows parents of children eligible for SCHIP to 
themselves be eligible for SCHIP.  
 
Finally, covariates included year fixed effects to capture national trends in the study outcomes 
and state fixed effects to control for unobserved differences among states. Additionally, in 
keeping with previous research, we performed sensitivity analyses that allowed for different 
trends in each state for particular age groups of children and different trends over time for 
specific age groups by including state-age and year-age interactions (Shore-Sheppard 2008). 
Estimates were weighted and standard errors were adjusted for weighting and clustering to 




The analytic sample in total includes 157,315 children in families with incomes between 200 and 
400 percent of the FPL; Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the sample of children from 
2009. Approximately 13 percent of children were publicly insured, 84 percent privately insured   11
and 7 percent uninsured. The majority of children were reported to be in excellent or very good 
health, with only 15.5 percent of children reported to be in good, fair or poor health. The highest 
level of education for either parent was a high school degree or GED for 22 percent of children; 
neither parent had graduated from high school among another 4 percent of children. Among U.S. 
born children, 11 percent had no U.S. born parent or grandparent and just over 2 percent of 
children were reported to be themselves foreign born. The majority of children, 79 percent, were 
living in a 2 parent family. Family income was reported to be between 200 and 300 percent of 
the FPL for nearly 58 percent of children; the remainder lived in families with incomes between 
300 and 400 percent of the FPL. 
 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of children eligible for CHIP in 2002 and 2009 by income group 
in the 18 states that expanded eligibility. Eligibility changed dramatically between 2002 and 
2009 for children in families in these states with incomes above 200% FPL. Whereas only 52 
percent of children in these states in families with incomes between two and two and one-half 
times the FPL were eligible in 2002, 86 percent were eligible in 2009. Similarly, the percentage 
of children in families in these states with incomes between 250 and 300 percent FPL who were 
eligible increased more than five-fold (from 11 to 63 percent). Less than 3 percent of children in 
families with between three and four times the FPL were eligible for CHIP in 2002. By 2009, 45 
percent of those with incomes between three and three and one half times the FPL were eligible, 
as were 31 percent of those with incomes up to four times the FPL.  
 
Regression Results: Effects on Take-up of Public Insurance and Uninsurance Rates   12
Table 2 presents the results from our multivariate analyses for the three study outcomes: take-up 
of public coverage, reduction in private coverage, and increase in insurance coverage rates. 
Specifically, we report the number of children who enroll in public coverage, drop private 
coverage, and move out of uninsurance per 100 children who become newly eligible for 
subsidized public insurance. 
 
We found that, for every 100 children who became eligible for public insurance, approximately 4 
took up public coverage and approximately 2 children fell from the ranks of the uninsured (Table 
2, Specification 1). The effect of the number of children who have private coverage was not 
statistically significant. Our findings were robust to the inclusion of state-age and year-age 
interactions as controls, as shown Specification 2.  
 
A noteworthy finding in Table 2 is that the number of children who took up public coverage 
exceeds the sum of the number of children who drop private coverage and the number of 
uninsured children who gain insurance coverage. This finding reflects the fact that after a public 
insurance expansion the number of persons who report both private and public insurance in 
population-based datasets like the CPS rises, and is consistent with earlier research (Gruber and 
Simon 2008). The degree to which this rise is due to more people having both types of coverage 
simultaneously or to transitions between types of coverage is unknown. 
 
Crowd-out 
The phenomenon described in the preceding paragraph has led researchers to develop two 
alternative methods for measuring crowd-out using a “narrow” definition and a “broad”   13
definition (Cutler and Gruber 1996; Davidson et al. 2004). Under the narrow definition, crowd-
out is measured as the number of children who drop private coverage divided by the number who 




Under the broad definition, crowd out is measured by calculating how much of the increase in 






The narrow definition focuses on whether private insurance rates have dropped as a result of 
expansion, whereas the broad definition focuses on the gap between the drop in the uninsured 
rate and the increase in public program enrollment.
5 
 
We found that, using the narrow definition, the point estimate for crowd out is not statistically 
different from zero (Table 3).
6  By contrast, using the broad definition, the point estimate for 
crowd-out is roughly 46 percent and is statistically significant (p<.05). Thus, at most 46 percent 
of the increase in public coverage could potentially have come from children who switched from 
private coverage.  
 
Discussion and Policy Implications 
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During the period prior to the ACA’s passage, states increasingly experimented with offering 
eligibility for public coverage to children in families with incomes that are more than twice the 
FPL. These changes provide an opportunity for new understanding of the effects of eligibility for 
public insurance among higher income children on enrollment in public insurance, enrollment in 
private insurance, uninsurance rates, and tradeoffs among them.  
 
Our analyses show that the 2002-2009 expansions to CHIP eligibility were associated with very 
limited take-up of public insurance among children in families with incomes between 2 and 4 
times the FPL, with 4 children enrolling for every 100 who became newly eligible. That such a 
small proportion of children newly eligible for public insurance actually enrolled in public 
coverage may seem surprising, but the rate is not dissimilar from earlier estimates of the effect of 
CHIP eligibility on take-up (LoSasso and Buchmuller 2004; Hudson et al. 2005; Gruber and 
Simon 2008), and moreover, reflects behavior among a higher income population compared to 
previous studies. Further, comparing our regression results to descriptive data for several states 
that expanded eligibility to 300 or 400 percent of the FPL confirms the validity of these findings.  
In Illinois, for example, the income eligibility threshold increased from 200 to 400 percent of the 
FPL in 2007 and enrollment in public coverage among children in families with incomes in that 
range grew from 9.9 percent to 13.8 percent between 2007 and 2008. Similarly, Wisconsin 
modified its income eligibility threshold from 185 percent to 300 percent of the FPL in 2008. 
Public coverage grew from 8.1 to 12.0 percentage points among children in the 200 to 400 
percent of the FPL income band.  
   15
Several factors are likely to explain the low take-up of public coverage for children in higher 
income families compared with their lower income counterparts. First, most children in families 
with incomes between 200 and 400 percent of the FPL have private coverage (around 90 percent 
in both Wisconsin and Illinois, for example). Second, the expansions of eligibility to children in 
these higher income families were coupled with sometimes substantial premium contribution 
requirements, which reduce the attractiveness of public coverage. Finally, the limited take-up of 
public coverage among higher income children may reflect that public coverage is less palatable 
to higher income families because of perceived stigma, a difference in the generosity or quality 
of public compared to private coverage options, and concern about the long-term security of 
public coverage availability. 
 
Our estimates further suggest that roughly half of the newly eligible children who take up public 
insurance were previously uninsured; that is, for every 100 children in families with incomes 
between 200 and 400 percent of the FPL who are made eligible for public insurance 2 move 
from being uninsured to having insurance coverage. Like take-up of public insurance among 
eligible children, the change in uninsurance is relatively small, although statistically significant.  
Because not all of the take-up of public insurance among eligible children is accounted for by 
children who transfer from being uninsured to having public insurance, our results suggest that 
there may be some crowd-out of private insurance coverage. Specifically, the upper bound 
crowd-out rate we calculate is 46 percent; that is, for every 10 children who enroll in public 
coverage, at most 5 are transfers from private coverage. Our lower bound estimate shows no 
statistically significant reduction in private coverage from the expansions.  
   16
Our study has several limitations, most of which arise from the limitations of the CPS-ASEC 
data. First, there is controversy about the time period to which insurance coverage information 
obtained from the CPS-ASEC actually apply. Although the interview questions are intended to 
elicit information from subjects about coverage during the preceding year, there is indirect 
evidence suggesting that this is not the case (Swartz 1986). In this study, we considered the 
coverage data to apply to the year of the interview. However, our results and conclusions did not 
change when we considered the coverage data to refer to the year preceding the interview. 
Second, some investigators have argued that distinctions between public coverage and non-group 
(i.e., individual) private coverage in the CPS-ASEC data may not be reliable (LoSasso and 
Buchmuller 2004) However, modifications in the interview instrument that were implemented in 
the early part of this decade were specifically aimed at improving this distinction. In preliminary 
analyses (data not shown), moreover, we found that reported non-group coverage behaved much 
more like group coverage than like public coverage.  
 
To conclude, our results indicate that states’ expansions of public eligibility to higher income 
children were associated with limited uptake of public coverage and only a two percentage point 
reduction in the uninsurance rate among these children. Not surprisingly, given the low uptake of 
public coverage, crowd-out was limited as well. Indeed, concern over crowd-out appears to 
provide no more a reason to restrict eligibility for public insurance among higher income 
children than it does among lower income children.  
 
Just as premiums for health insurance coverage purchased through the CHIP expansion programs 
studied in this article are subsidized for low and middle income families, so too will premium   17
costs be subsidized under the ACA for insurance coverage that families with incomes under 400 
percent of the FPL purchase through health insurance exchanges. The results of this study 
suggest that the availability of subsidized health insurance coverage for families with incomes up 




1. Some states offered unsubsidized (full-cost) eligibility for public coverage for higher income 
children. 
 
2. We limit our sample to children in families with incomes below 400 FPL because children 
above this threshold may be eligible to enroll in public insurance at full-cost; however, the 
availability of these types of unsubsidized options for families are not comprehensively 
documented. We restrict our attention to eligibility for subsidized public insurance. We exclude 
children who appear to have neither a parent nor a grandparent in the household or who report 
having Medicare. 
 
3. Income disregards for 2002 through 2004 were extracted from the Urban Institute’s Transfer 
Income Model, version 3 (TRIM3). Information on disregards for 2008 are taken from the Kaiser 
Family Foundation’s State Health Facts website. We imputed income disregard values for 
intervening years. For states in which the disregard amounts are the same in 2004 and 2008, 
those values are assumed to have remained constant through the three year gap in data. For states 
that changed the amount of income that could be disregarded, we assume that the change took 
place in 2006.  
 
4. Gruber and Simon (2009) provide a review of crowd-out estimates from various studies and 
the calculations underlying them. 
  
5. The narrow definition treats private coverage for children who report both types of coverage 
as not being crowded-out and provides a lower bound on crowd out. The broad definition treats 
the private coverage for children who have both types of coverage as being crowded-out and 
provides an upper bound on crowd out. 
 
6. We determined statistical significance using standard errors for the crowd-out estimates 
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Income as a Percentage of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL)
2002
2009
 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Std  Dev
Dependent Variables    
Public insurance  0.133  (0.340) 
Private insurance  0.844  (0.362) 
No insurance  0.072  (0.259) 
Independent Variables    
Individual and Family Characteristics    
Eligible for public insurance (imputed)  0.394  (0.489) 
Non-Hispanic White  0.641  (0.480) 
Non-Hispanic Black  0.129  (0.335) 
Hispanic 0.173  (0.378) 
Other race  0.057  (0.232) 
Age 0-2  0.156  (0.363) 
Age 3-5  0.162  (0.369) 
Age 6-12  0.386  (0.487) 
Age 13-18  0.296  (0.456) 
Male 0.512  (0.500) 
Family with 1 child  0.206  (0.404) 
Family with 2 children  0.424  (0.494) 
Family with 3 children  0.245  (0.430) 
Family with 4 children  0.088  (0.284) 
Family with 5 or more children  0.036  (0.187) 
Reported health is good, fair or poor  0.155  (0.362) 
Parent with highest level of education is college graduate  0.380  (0.485) 
Parent with highest level of education attended some college  0.363  (0.481) 
Parent with highest level of education is high school graduate or has GED  0.221  (0.415) 
Neither parent is high school graduate  0.036  (0.186) 
Foreign born, lived in U.S. <=5 years   0.010  (0.101) 
Foreign born, lived in U.S. >5 years  0.014  (0.118) 
U.S. born with no U.S. born parent/grandparent 0.112  (0.315) 
U.S. born with at least 1 U.S. born parent/grandparent  0.864  (0.343) 
Urban location  0.824  (0.381) 
Two parent family  0.785  (0.411) 
Family income 201-250% FPL  0.303  (0.460) 
Family income 251-300% FPL  0.273  (0.446) 
Family income 301-350% FPL  0.227  (0.419) 
Family income 351-400% FPL  0.196  (0.397) 
Characteristics of parental employment     
Working part-time  0.035  (0.183) 
Self employed  0.043  (0.204) 
Public sector employee  0.216  (0.412) 
Neither parent employed  0.010  (0.100) 
Firm size of parent employed in largest firm:    
Firm size <10  0.059  (0.236) 
Firm size 10 to 24  0.051  (0.220) 
Firm size 25 to 99  0.101  (0.302) 
Firm size 100 to 499  0.114  (0.318) 
Firm size 500 to 999  0.049  (0.216) Firm size 1000+  0.314  (0.464) 
Parental occupation     
Management, professional, etc.  0.294  (0.456) 
Production, transport., etc.  0.130  (0.336) 
Sales & office  0.144  (0.351) 
Construction & maintenance  0.069  (0.254) 
Service 0.033  (0.180) 
Farming, fishing, forestry 0.001  (0.035) 
Unknown occupation  0.015  (0.123) 
State-Level Characteristics    
Percent unemployed  0.093  (0.019) 
Lagged percent unemployed  0.054  (0.011) 
Per capita income (in $100,000)  0.268  (0.030) 
Percent of children 0-5 in poverty   0.219  (0.048) 
Percent children 6-18 in poverty   0.179  (0.036) 
Rate of unionization  0.122  (0.064) 
Private insurance premium (in $10,000)  0.402  (0.046) 
Program Characteristics    
Parental CHIP eligibility waiver  0.177  (0.382) 
Separate CHIP program  0.856  (0.351) 
Notes: Descriptive statistics are for 18,514 children in the CPS with incomes between 200 and 400 percent 
of the FPL in the 2009 CPS. Full analytic data includes 157,315 children.  
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P 2002 2009 
Table 2:  Effects of Expanded CHIP Eligibility on Take-up of Public Coverage, 
Reductions in Private Coverage, and Insurance Coverage, 2002-2009 





Number who enroll in public coverage  4.21 ***  4.12 *** 
Number who drop private coverage  -0.14  -0.19 
Number who move from being uninsured to being insured  2.26 ***  2.31 *** 
Notes: *** p<.01;   Specification 1 includes the full set of individual and family characteristics, state 
characteristics, program characteristics, and state and year fixed effects, as described in the text. 
Specification 2 additionally includes state-age and year-age controls. 
 
 
Table 3: Estimates of Crowd-Out Associated with CHIP Expansions, 2002-2009 
 
Per 100 children who take up public coverage  Specification 
(1) 
Crowd-out estimate, narrow definition  3.3 
Crowd-out estimate, broad definition  46.3** 
Notes: **p<.05.  Standard errors derived using the delta method. 
 
 